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The paper focuses on the question of what the (visual) perceptual differences are
between individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and typically developing (TD)
individuals. We argue against the view that autistic subjects have a deficiency in the
most basic form of perceptual consciousness—namely, phenomenal consciousness.
Instead, we maintain, the perceptual atypicality of individuals with autism is of a more
conceptual and cognitive sort—their perceptual experiences share crucial aspects
with TD individuals. Our starting point is Ben Shalom’s (2005, 2009) three-level
processing framework for explaining atypicality in several domains of processing among
autistics, which we compare with two other tripartite models of perception—Jackendoff’s
(1987) and Prinz’s (2000, 2005a, 2007) Intermediate Level Hypothesis and Lamme’s
(2004, 2006, 2010) neural account of consciousness. According to these models,
whereas the second level of processing is concerned with viewer-centered visual
representations of basic visual properties and incorporates some early forms of
integration, the third level is more cognitive and conceptual. We argue that the data
suggest that the atypicality in autism is restricted mainly to the third level. More
specifically, second-level integration, which is the mark of phenomenal consciousness,
is typical, yet third-level integration of perceptual objects and concepts is atypical.
Thus, the basic experiences of individuals with autism are likely to be similar to
typical subjects’ experiences; the main difference lies in the sort of cognitive access
the subjects have to their experiences. We conclude by discussing implications
of the suggested analysis of experience in autism for conceptions of phenomenal
consciousness.
Keywords: autism spectrum disorders, phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness, perceptual
integration, categorization
What are the (visual) perceptual differences between individuals with autism spectrum
disorders (ASD) and typically developing (TD) individuals? Do autistic subjects have a
deficiency in what is called in standard philosophical jargon ‘‘phenomenal consciousness’’—the
most basic form of perceptual consciousness? Or is it that the perceptual difference
between individuals with ASD and TD individuals is of a more conceptual and cognitive
sort, whereas the most basic perceptual experiences of individuals belonging to these
two groups are similar? Ben Shalom (2005, 2009) suggests a three-level processing
framework to explain atypicality in several domains of processing among individuals
with ASD, which is highly relevant to these questions. She argues that individuals with
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autism and TD individuals do differ in their basic perceptual
experiences. In what follows we will discuss the (visual)
perceptual differences between individuals with ASD and TD
individuals, taking Ben Shalom’s tripartite model of perception
as a starting point, and present our own view on the issues
at hand. We will argue that the evidence tells against the
view that autistic subjects have a deficiency in basic perceptual
consciousness and support the hypothesis that the perceptual
difference between autistics and TD individuals is of a more
conceptual and cognitive sort.
In the first section we examine the three-level distinction
of perceptual processing proposed by Ben Shalom, by
comparing it with two other tripartite models of perceptual
processing—Jackendoff’s and Prinz’ Intermediate Level
Hypothesis (Jackendoff, 1987; Prinz, 2000, 2005a, 2007)
and Lamme’s (2004, 2006, 2010) neural account of
consciousness—while emphasizing the role of integration
in each model. In the second section we introduce the debate
regarding the possible dissociation between two types of
consciousness: phenomenal consciousness (or experience) and
access consciousness.We discuss eachmodel’s stance with regard
to this debate. In the third section, we argue that the evidence
suggests that in autism second-level integration, which is the
mark of phenomenality, is typical, yet third-level integration of
perceptual objects and concepts is atypical. In the fourth section
we further clarify that argument, and show, further, that it
supports the view that individuals with ASD and TD individuals
do not differ in their basic experiences, but rather have different
cognitive access to those experiences. We conclude by discussing
implications of the suggested analysis of experience in autism for
conceptions of phenomenal consciousness.
Levels of Perceptual Processing:
Examination of Ben Shalom’s Model
Tripartite Models of Perceptual Processing
There are several tripartite models of perceptual processing
in the literature on perceptual consciousness. Here, we
discuss similarities and differences between three such
conceptualizations. The first is Ben Shalom’s (2005, 2009)
framework, used in her analysis of perceptual atypicality
in ASD. The other two models are Jackendoff’s and Prinz’
Intermediate-Level Hypothesis (henceforth, ILH; Jackendoff,
1987; Prinz, 2000, 2005a, 2007), and Lamme’s (2004,
2006, 2010) neural account of perceptual consciousness,
both of which pertain to the explanation of perceptual
experience.
According to Ben Shalom (2005, 2009), processing in
different psychological domains takes place at three general
levels of processing: basic, integrative and logical. Specifically,
in the perceptual domain, conscious object recognition is
suggested to involve processing in three levels: (1) a level
of basic processing, which does not include a conscious
experience of the percept; (2) an integrative level based on
perceptual objects, which includes experience; and (3) a logical
higher-order level of processing. Ben Shalom suggests that
the phenomenon of perceptual object fragmentation among
individuals with ASD is the result of atypicality at the
integrative level, due to lack of prioritization of the whole
integrated object at the expense of object features. The
reduced salience of the integrated object can be overcome
by effortful logical processing of perception at the third
level.
The ILH, proposed by Jackendoff (1987) and elaborated
on recently by Prinz (2000, 2005a, 2007), claims that visual
processing takes place at three stages that vary in their
abstraction, and that conscious visual experience arises at
the intermediate level. Similarly to Ben Shalom’s model, the
theory can be applied to several domains, and here we
focus on perception. In the visual modality, the ILH is
inspired by Marr’s (1982) theory of visual processing. The
low-level is ‘‘the primal sketch level’’, which is organized
retinotopically, and is responsible for encoding blobs, bars
and edges. This level is highly detailed, but does not include
a coherent representation of an object. The intermediate-
level is ‘‘the 2.5D sketch level’’, which is responsible for
the creation of a coherent representation of the object
from the specific viewpoint of the observer. The high-
level—the ‘‘3D model level’’—contains a viewpoint-invariant
representation that lacks specific details, allowing for the
assignment of the object to an abstract category. According
to both Prinz and Jackendoff, the high level is ideal for
object recognition. That is, the perceptual hierarchy starts
from the registration of specific local features, proceeds
to the combination of these features into coherent objects
(e.g., feature binding) and ends with the processing of
abstract properties of the object. Based on introspective
and empirical arguments, Jackendoff and Prinz claim that
only intermediate-level representations match the content of
perceptual consciousness: representations of coherent bound-
together objects, including their features represented from a
specific point of view.
Lamme (2004, 2006, 2010) distinguishes among three
levels of perceptual processing, based on neural processing
characteristics: (1) a low level of fast feedforward sweeps;
(2) a level of superficial recurrent processing that is limited to
visual areas; and (3) a level of deep recurrent processing, in
which recurrent processing becomes widespread. At the first
level, feedforward sweeps flow serially throughout the visual
stream, enabling feature extraction.1 At the second level—the
superficial recurrent processing level—each area to which the
feedforward sweeps reaches begins sending feedback to lower
levels in local groups, thus enabling perceptual integration
of different aspects of objects and scenes into a coherent
percept. Similarly to ILH’s conception of the intermediate-
level, the superficial recurrent processing level is characterized
as similar to Marr’s 2.5 sketch (Lamme, 2004) and as neural
1Lamme has recently divided this level into two distinct levels—superficial
feedforward sweeps, which are limited to visual areas, and deep feedforward
sweeps, which reach the prefrontal cortex (Lamme, 2010). This distinction
leads him to claim that consciousness and attention are orthogonal. This issue
is less relevant to our present discussion, and therefore we will focus on the
original and simpler version of his distinction.
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activity that gives rise to perceptual experience. The third
level—the deep recurrent processing level—involves attentional
selection of a limited number of local recurrent processes, and
manifests in the amplification of these processes to widespread
co-activation of visual and frontoparietal regions. Widespread
recurrent processing allows accessibility of attended objects to
other processes. This stage corresponds to the global workspace
conception (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Baars, 2005; Dehaene
et al., 2006) and to working memory (WM). It should be
noted that Lamme’s model is highly consistent with other recent
accounts of simultaneous bottom-up and top-down processing
(e.g., Hochstein and Ahissar, 2002; Bar et al., 2006), which
influenced Ben Shalom’s model as well (Ben Shalom, 2005,
2009).
The Importance of Integration for Experience
It is noticeable that the three models outlined above share
some common ground. Overall, the three models seem to
share the same conceptualization of perceptual processing.
In all cases, processing begins with extraction of individual
features, proceeds with integration of features into coherent
objects and ends with abstraction and reasoning. Moreover,
all three seem to agree that the content of experience is
achieved at the second level of the hierarchy. Both Lamme
and Jackendoff and Prinz explicitly argue for this claim and
we will shortly outline their considerations in its favor. Ben
Shalom does not explicitly present the reasons for her claim
that experience should be ascribed at the integrative level.
However, her analysis seems to imply that the integration of
features into a coherent object is necessary for the emergence of
experience.
The main goal of ILH is to claim that the 2.5 sketch
level is the locale of the content of experience (Prinz, 2007),
i.e., that the content of experience is constituted by second-
level representations. According to Jackendoff (1987), the locale
of the content of conscious experience can be derived from
introspection: the content of our experience is neither as
specific as low-level representations nor as abstract as high-
level representations, but is rather revealed to us as a coherent
bound-together object, including its features represented from
a specific point of view. A similar point is vividly made
by Treisman (2003): when trying to imagine a triangle, we
picture a very specific one, with a certain shape (e.g., a
right angle triangle), size, length of sides, orientation, color
and location in space, so that all these features are bound
together in a particular way. Beyond the argument from
introspection, Prinz (2000, 2005a, 2007) argues that detailed
viewpoint-specific representations are necessary for deliberate
behavioral responses, and that patterns of neuropsychological
damage after lesions in areas related to each level support
this conclusion as well. However, it should be noted that
according to Prinz (2011a), as part of his AIR theory (attended
intermediate-level representations theory), the mere processing
of representations in the intermediate level is not sufficient
for consciousness—only stimuli whose representations are
modulated by attention and made accessible to WM are
experienced. That is, although the second level is the locale of
the content of experience, not every second-level representation
is experienced.
Lamme (2010) has not only argued in favor of localizing
the content of experience at the second level, but also in
favor of localizing experience itself at this level. He has
argued that representations processed at the second level are
phenomenally conscious as part of his neural argument, an
argument that bears on the debate that we shall soon present. The
neural argument is based on several assumptions. First, Lamme
assumes that first-level representations are not experienced.
This seems to be agreed on by all models, and consistent
with introspection. The second assumption, which is also
reasonable and uncontentious, is that third-level representations
are conscious, since they are accessible for use in reasoning
and behavioral control through WM or the global workspace
(i.e., available for report, reasoning and the production of
intentional behavior). The third assumption, which is the most
important to our current discussion, is that neural processing
at the second level is more similar to the third level than to the
first, since it underlies properties necessary for consciousness,
notably integration and plasticity. Recurrent processing, whether
deep or superficial, allows interactions between areas, so that
processing in areas that are located higher in the feedforward
hierarchy affect and modify processing in lower areas of the
hierarchy. This enables aspects of integration such as feature
binding and grouping, which, as argued above, are key properties
of experience. As Lamme emphasizes, second level activity
produces high Φ, which according to Tononi (2007) denotes
the amount of integrated information generated by a system
when switching from one processing state to another. In Tononi’s
words, ‘‘subjective experience is integrated information’’ (2007,
p.297; emphasis in the original), and generation of high Φ
is the criteria for conscious systems. Recurrent processing
also gives rise to plasticity and learning, by satisfying Hebb’s
rule. Because the second level is more similar to the third
level than to the first, Lamme concludes that second level
representations are experienced as well. That is, according to
Lamme the second level is not only the locale of the content of
experience, but also the locale of experience itself : second-level
representations are experienced in virtue of being processed at
this level.
Although all three models agree that integration takes place at
the second level, and that integration is essential for experience,
they seem to disagree on the type of integration achieved at this
level. According to Ben Shalom, integration at the second level
is not only perceptual, but also includes precise categorization.
For example, when perceiving a white plate, the integrative level
is in charge of making the representation of the integrated object
‘‘plate’’ more prominent than the representations of its separate
features, ‘‘white’’ and ‘‘round’’. Due to abnormal integration, for
people with ASD the representation of the object (e.g., ‘‘plate’’) is
not amplified (Ben Shalom, 2005).
In contrast, ILH suggests that precise categorization occurs
only at the third level Prinz (2005a, 2007). The second level
contains a 2.5D sketch of the world, and thus integration is
interpreted as binding of features into a coherent object from
a specific point of view. ILH argues that the third level is
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the one most suitable for object recognition, since the 3D
model of the world contains abstract and viewpoint-invariant
representations. As part of his defense on concept empiricism,
Prinz has argued that concepts are mental representation
of categories in WM (or that can be in WM), that are
based on the identification of perceived objects (Prinz, 2002,
2005b, 2012; see also Barsalou, 1987, 2005). Concepts are
constructed from representations in long-term memory that
are based on third-level representation rather than on second-
level representations. This entails that a representation of an
object must be formed prior to categorization, at least in
a tentative manner. Although this issue is debated in the
philosophical literature, Prinz’s (2007, 2011a) stance is that
high-level perceptual representations (such as concepts or
categories, e.g., being a chair) are not part of the content
of our experience: even-though third-level representations of
concepts can be activated in WM, they are not experienced
(but see, e.g., Siegel, 2010, for a contrary view). Prinz
(2011b) supports this claim with an example of patients
with semantic dementia, who cannot recognize objects and
use conceptual knowledge but nonetheless have typical object
perception phenomenology (e.g., match images). Thus, ILH
would argue that when perceiving a white plate, the features
‘‘white’’ and ‘‘round’’ are bound together at the intermediate
level, forming a combined representation of the conjunction
‘‘white and round’’, whereas the category ‘‘plate’’ is assigned
to the object at the third level, after the creation of a 3D
viewpoint-invariant representation. It should be noted that this
process is not strictly bottom-up, and top-down information
can affect categorization as well as experience. For example,
context can affect the concept representation that will be
used in WM in a certain situation (Prinz, 2002, 2011b).
However, in the absence of contextual information, a default
representation of the concept will be active in WM. In addition,
concepts can alter second-level representations in a top-down
process.
In Lamme’s model, categorization is achieved gradually, with
different degrees of categorization occurring at different levels.
Although Lamme (2010) regards his second level as similar to
Marr’s 2.5D sketch (2004), he also argues that conscious percepts
are characterized by integration of features and categories, which
enables feature-invariant processing and differentiation of the
object from other categories (e.g., not a house), a description
that better matches the 3D sketch. Lamme has suggested that
there is a higher type of integration at the third level. For
example, an identification of the stimulus as a face (rather than
a still object) is achieved prior to recognition of the identity
of the face (Lamme, 2010). Therefore, he may regard basic
categorization (e.g., faces vs. still objects) as occurring at the
second level and specific categorization (e.g., recognition of
the type of still object as a plate) as achieved at the third
level.
Lamme’s notion of degrees of categorization is in line
with other accounts of categorization. According to the Two-
State Interactive (2SI) account of visual object recognition
proposed by Schendan and colleagues (Schendan and Kutas,
2007; Schendan and Stern, 2008), initial classification is achieved
during fast feedforward processing, but precise categorization
occurs later on, during co-activation and combined feedforward
and feedback interactions between ventral-path areas and
areas in the prefrontal cortex and medial temporal lobe.
In this later stage, bottom-up and top-down information is
integrated. Although there are some discrepancies between
Lamme’s account and the 2SI account, they share the idea,
which is important to our purposes, that precise categorization
occurs at the third level. This idea is also consistent with
Bar et al.’s (2006) evidence for early categorization of
classes of objects according to low spatial frequencies, later
used for top-down facilitation of object recognition through
narrowing down of interpretation options (similar ideas are
portrayed in the reverse hierarchy theory, see Hochstein and
Ahissar, 2002). However, Bar’s model would predict earlier
categorization during rapid feedback modulation (Bar, 2003;
Bar et al., 2006; Schendan and Stern, 2008). Additionally,
the 2SI theory fits well with Prinz’ suggestion that context
can affect categorization in a top-down manner. Thus, there
are reasons for thinking that for complex objects, there are
two main stages of categorization: (1) extraction of a general
category based on context and its integration with feature
binding information at the second level; and (2) precise
categorization resulting in explicit object identification at the
third level.
In sum, taken together, we suggest that object integration
takes place at the second level, and that precise categorization
should be considered as part of third-level processing. We agree
with the three models that feature integration takes place at
the second level, so that a representation of a coherent object
from a specific point of view is achieved at this intermediate
level. In addition, this representation of a coherent object is
integrated with a general category through an initial classification
processes. However, integration of objects with their precise
category takes place at the third level, which contains viewpoint-
invariant representations of objects with their identification.
Phenomenal Consciousness, Access
Consciousness and Perceptual Integration
Two Notions of Consciousness—The Overflow
Debate
There are two central notions of consciousness that are
relevant to perceptual consciousness: phenomenal consciousness
and access consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness is the
experience one undergoes when, e.g., perceiving the world
(Block, 2002). Hereafter, ‘‘phenomenal consciousness’’ and
‘‘perceptual experience’’ (or simply ‘‘experience’’) will be
used interchangeably. Phenomenally conscious states involve
subjective experiential aspects, so that there is something ‘‘it
is like’’ to undergo them. As was emphasized in the previous
section, perceptual integration is a key aspect of experience.
Access consciousness (or cognitive access) is obtained when
a representation can be used freely in reasoning, decision
making, report and rational control of action, in virtue
of being accessible to WM or to the global workspace
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(e.g., Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Baars, 2005; Block,
2008).
Clearly, these are two different concepts of consciousness: the
one thoroughly phenomenal and the other thoroughly functional
(Block, 2002). However, the fact that the concepts are different
does not entail that the phenomena are different. There is a
debate regarding whether phenomenal consciousness and access
consciousness are two aspects of the same phenomena or whether
they are dissociable. According to one view, access consciousness
is necessary for phenomenal consciousness (e.g., Dehaene and
Naccache, 2001). That is, only representations that are accessible
to the capacity-limited WM (3–4 items, see, e.g., Luck and
Vogel, 1997) are experienced. This view may seem intuitive,
since it reflects a folk psychological tendency of subjects to
withhold attributions of consciousness to themselves in cases in
which they cannot report, or deliberately act upon, perceptual
stimuli. According to the opposite stance, cognitive access
is not necessary for phenomenal consciousness—i.e., there
are phenomenally conscious states that are inaccessible and
thus cannot be reported (Block, 2002, 2007, 2008; Lamme,
2010).
The question whether cognitive access is necessary for
phenomenal consciousness is essentially related to another issue
regarding the nature of experience: is our experience rich or
sparse? Introspection seems to reveal rich perceptual experiences
of a world full of colors, shapes and many details. However,
phenomena such as change blindness and inattentional blindness
appear to suggest otherwise: when viewing a visual scene, subjects
fail to notice a change or an appearance of a new salient object,
such as a gorilla among basketball players (Block, 2008; Smithies,
2011). Does this mean that we suffer from a radical illusion,
so that although it seems to us that our experience is rich,
it is in fact sparse? Those who claim that cognitive access is
necessary for phenomenality would be inclined to answer that
our experience is sparse, as we can only experience up to 3–4
items (in accordance with WM capacity limits), or at most up
to 4 detailed representations and several other fragmented or
generic representations (Block, 2011). This conclusion is hard
to swallow, given that phenomenal consciousness is defined as
what it is like for the subject to be in a conscious state, and
subjects claim that they experience (in detail) more than they can
report.
In an influential paper, Block (2007, 2008) argued that
phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness rely on
two different memory mechanisms with different capacities.
Block agrees that access consciousness relies on WM and is
thus limited to 3–4 items. However, he suggests that underlying
phenomenal consciousness is a differentmechanism—perceptual
memory—which has a larger capacity. In one of the key
moves of his overflow argument, Block appeals to the work
of Landman et al. (2003), which demonstrates that when
a retro-cue that indicates a specific item appears after the
offset of a presentation of a memory array in a Sperling-
like change detection task, subjects are able to detect changes
in six to seven items, exceeding the limits of WM capacity.
This effect is attributed to storage of detailed representations
in a temporary memory mechanism with larger capacity
than the capacity of WM—fragile short-term memory (Sligte
et al., 2008; Block, 2011; Pinto et al., 2013). According
to Block, this storage consists of phenomenally conscious
representations, whereas the few representations that are
subsequently selected to enter WM are also cognitively accessed.
Thus, the capacity of the mechanism underlying phenomenal
consciousness ‘‘overflows’’ the capacity of the mechanism
underlying access consciousness. Block concludes that since
phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness rely on
different mechanisms with different capacities and properties,
they are separate and dissociable. Opponents of his view claim
that although there are some representations that are not
accessed in WM, these are not phenomenally conscious (e.g.,
Cohen and Dennett, 2011).
In the context of the overflow debate, it may be helpful
to revisit the assumption that the second level is the locale
of the content of experience. As already mentioned, all three
models presented in the previous section (as well as some
others, e.g., Block’s 2008) seem to agree on this assumption.
Yet, it should be noted that it is not universally accepted
(e.g., Kouider et al., 2010; Cohen and Dennett, 2011). The
question what renders a state phenomenally conscious and the
question what sorts of contents are phenomenally conscious
are considered by many (if not most) philosophers to be
separate questions. Nevertheless, the dissociation view has some
commitments vis a vis the latter question—clearly, it presupposes
that the contents of second-level representations are of a sort
that can be made phenomenally conscious. As is demonstrated
by Prinz’s (2011a) AIR theory, that view may still require
further modulation of such representations (that does not
amount to their being encoded in WM) in order for them
to be phenomenally conscious. Also, it is worth noting that
the dissociation view is compatible with the idea that further
third-level processing may affect, and specifically add to, the
contents of experience—it need not insist that those contents
are exhausted by the contents of second-level representations. In
line with the three models, and as proponents of the dissociation
view, we hereafter assume that the contents of second-level
representations are of a sort that can be made phenomenally
conscious, and further, as proponents of ILH, we adhere to
the stronger assumption that the contents of experiences are
exhaustively determined by representations of this sort (which
can nevertheless be influenced top-down by processing at the
third level).
The Tripartite Models in Relation to the Overflow
Debate
Let us consider the relations between the different stances
towards the overflow debate and the three models of perceptual
processing outlined in Section Levels of perceptual processing:
Examination of Ben Shalom’s model. Although not all advocates
of these models explicitly allude to that debate, they would
agree that access consciousness resides at the third level,
because the mechanism underlying this level in all models
is WM. They would further agree on the notion that the
content of experience (phenomenal consciousness) arises
at the intermediate level. Yet, it seems that they would
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 5 April 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 204
Yatziv and Jacobson Visual consciousness in autism
disagree over whether to ascribe phenomenal consciousness
to second-level representations or to third-level representations.
Specifically, they give different predictions as to whether
representations that (due to, e.g., attentional selection
limitations) are processed only up to the second level and
do not enter the third level (i.e., WM), are phenomenally
conscious. Lamme is one of the prominent advocates of the
dissociation between phenomenal consciousness and access
consciousness. Prinz’ AIR theory stands somewhere in between
the two stances. Ben Shalom does not explicitly address the
question.
Lamme (2004, 2006, 2010) provides further support for the
dissociation between phenomenal consciousness and cognitive
access through his neural argument (which was outlined above).
According to this argument, recall, there is a fundamental
difference in processing between the first and the second
levels, since recurrent processing enables integration, learning
and plasticity, whereas feedforward sweeps do not. On the
other hand, there is no fundamental neural difference between
the second and third levels: both allow the key feature of
integration through recurrent processing. Lamme provides
evidence that processing at the second level is characterized
by the important properties we attribute to experience: feature
integration, perceptual competition and susceptibility to illusion
(Lamme, 2010). The difference between the two levels lies in
the extent of recurrent processing, with superficial recurrent
processing at the second level and widespread recurrent
processing at the third. The spread of activity at the third
level enables connections between modules in the global
workspace (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Lamme, 2010) and
thus reportability. However, the nature of neural activity
is equivalent in the two stages. Therefore, since the only
categorical difference is in reportability, there is no reason to
ascribe consciousness to the third level but not to the second
level.
Contrary to Lamme, Prinz (2011a) argues in his AIR theory
(which expands on ILH) that in order for a second-level
representation to become conscious, it should be modulated by
attention and thus become accessible to WM. Yet, according
to Prinz, phenomenality does not require actual access to, or
encoding in, WM. Furthermore, representations in WM are
third-level representations, and as such, according to the ILH
component of AIR, they are of a different sort than phenomenally
conscious representations: it is second-level representations,
rather than third-level ones, that are representations of coherent
bound-together objects, including their features represented
from a specific point of view. In this sense, then, phenomenal
consciousness does overflow the content of WM.
Access and Phenomenal Consciousness in
Autism Spectrum Disorders
The Relevance of the Overflow Debate for
Understanding Consciousness in Autism
Ben Shalom (2005, 2009) suggests that individuals with ASD
and TD individuals differ in perceptual integration at the second
level. According to her account, people with autism do not have
the same basic experiences—the same phenomenally conscious
states—as other people do. As we have argued above, integration
is considered a key aspect of phenomenal consciousness, and
thus lack of typical integration in autism would seem to imply
different phenomenology.
Notwithstanding, the debate regarding whether phenomenal
consciousness and access consciousness are dissociable has
implications for the understanding of experience in autism. If
access consciousness is necessary for phenomenal consciousness,
then, given that people with ASD have lesser access to integrative
information, the conclusion that phenomenal consciousness
is atypical in autism is inevitable. However, if cognitive
access and phenomenal consciousness are dissociable, then
another possibility emerges: it is possible that the apparent
atypicality in integration among individuals with ASD stems
from atypical accessibility, rather than atypical experience.
That is, it is possible that integration at the second level
is similar among people with and without ASD, but the
difference lies in integrative information at the third level.
Specifically, we suggest that individuals with ASD have typical
phenomenal experiences of objects, yet access those experiences
differently: although viewpoint-specific representations of
perceptual objects are achieved at the second level among both
autistics and non-autistics, viewpoint-invariant representations
and precise categorization at the third-level are accessible
to a lesser extent among individuals with autism (be it
due to less accessibility of these representations or lack of
automatic formation of such representations). Here, we
suggest a framework in which a core characterization of
ASD lies in atypicality at the stage in which perceptual
representations of objects (formed at the second level)
are integrated with precise categories, yet the experiences
of individuals with ASD and those of TD individuals are
similar.
Key is the need for a clearer specification of the type of
atypical integration in ASD. There is little doubt that the most
basic sort of integration, namely feature binding, is achieved
in ASD (e.g., Plaisted et al., 1998; see Section Evidence for
typical second-level integration in autism). Yet, this leaves room
for two possible notions of atypicality: insufficient emphasis
of the representation of binding (e.g., the conjunction ‘‘white
and round’’) or lack of precise categorization (e.g., ‘‘plate’’; Ben
Shalom, 2005). Both notions are consistent with the possibility
that integration at the second level among individuals with ASD
is typical, and that the abnormality stems from inaccessibility
of integrated representations. According to the first possibility,
lack of emphasis of the binding information, manifested in lower
activation of binding information, results in the representations’
failing to be selected andmobilized to the third level. With regard
to the second possibility, if the locale of higher categorization
is considered to be at the third (rather than the second)
level (as is the case, e.g., according to ILH and 2SI, and as
we suggested in Section The importance of integration for
experience), then atypicality lies in difficulty to assign the object
to the appropriate category at the third level, due to lesser
accessibility of viewpoint-invariant representations of objects.
Ben Shalom’s suggestion that lack of integration in ASD is
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compensated by effortful use of third-level resources is consistent
with this interpretation.
In the following section, we review findings regarding
integration and object categorization among people with
ASD and provide evidence indicating typical second-level
representation and atypical third-level representations in autism.
We suggest that the second option of atypical integration
in autism is most suitable for explaining the data, i.e., that
atypicality in integration in autism consists in lack of precise
categorization. Hereafter, our examination of the nature of
representations among individuals with and without autism
relies mostly on Prinz’ characterization of representations at
different levels of processing, and our examination of neural
activity among autistics and non-autistics relies mostly on
Lamme’s framework.
Evidence for Typical Second-Level Integration in
Autism
As mentioned, there is little doubt that individuals with ASD
achieve feature binding, and thus possess representations of
coherent objects. First, people with ASD detect conjunctions
of features in the visual search paradigm even faster and more
accurately than TD individuals (Plaisted et al., 1998; O’Riordan
and Plaisted, 2001; O’Riordan et al., 2001; O’riordan, 2004).
In the conjunction condition of the visual search, targets and
distractors contain different combinations of similar features,
and thus performance on this task would be impossible without
feature binding. Furthermore, TD individuals and individuals
with ASD perform similarly on discrimination tasks that require
color and shape conjunctions (Plaisted et al., 2003). In the
discrimination and the visual search tasks, subjects with ASD
do not have a conjunction cost: they perform similarly when
asked to detect a target according to either a feature or a
combination of features (Plaisted et al., 1998, 2003). In addition,
children with ASD outperform TD children in mental rotation
tasks as well (Falter et al., 2008), which require representations
of objects as wholes. Finally, individuals with ASD seem
to form ‘‘event files’’ (Zmigrod et al., 2013)—integrated
representations of associations between objects and behavioral
responses. Event file formation is indicated by an implicit
measure of repetition cost—a performance deficit that is evident
after incomplete repetitions of stimulus-feature or stimulus-
response combinations, as compared to complete repetition or
alternation. All these findings indicate that feature binding,
and thus the formation of representations of objects, is
intact in autism. Moreover, such data refute the possibility
that binding information is not accessible to individuals
with ASD. On the contrary, it suggests that people with
autism have an even better access to representations of this
type.
We should note that according to O’Riordan and Plaisted
(2001; O’riordan, 2004), the superiority of autistics in visual
search does not stem from better feature integration, but rather
from an enhanced ability to discriminate between similar items
(e.g., targets and distractors). In support of this claim, they
found that when performing triple conjunctions conditions
(i.e., the target is identified using three features) compared to
conjunctions of two features, and when features were highly
similar in featural dimensions, subjects with ASD had less cost
compared to TD participants.
Susceptibility to visual illusions is another manifestation of a
sort of integration that is considered an aspect of phenomenal
consciousness (Lamme, 2010). Visual illusions have a remarkably
strong impact on experience: TD individuals report experiencing
them even when they know how these illusions affect perception
(e.g., Bruno and Franz, 2009). Susceptibility to illusions should
take place at the second level of processing (Lamme, 2010), and
it requires the presence of a representation of an integrated
object. Ropar and Mitchell (1999) examined susceptibility to
visual illusions such as the Titchener circles and the Muller-
Lyer figures, among subjects with ASD. They used two measures
in order to assess both explicit and implicit susceptibility
to illusions. Explicit susceptibility was assessed using verbal
judgment of the stimuli (e.g., subjects were asked ‘‘are these
two circles different sizes or the same size?’’ with regard to a
Titchener circles stimulus). In the implicit measure, participants
were asked to adjust the lengths of lines or size of circles rather
than judge them explicitly. Subjects with ASD and TD subjects
did not differ in their performance in both versions of the task.
Garner and Hamilton (2001) reported susceptibility to visual
illusions among subjects with autism as well. We should note
that Happé (1996) failed to find susceptibility to illusions among
subjects with ASD. However, Happé’s results may have been
influenced by other factors (see Ropar and Mitchell for criticism
of Happé’s methodology). Thus, most evidence indicates that
individuals with ASD are susceptible to visual illusions similarly
to TD people, and may also access the experience of these
illusions.
In addition, autistics seem to have typical use of contextual
information. López and Leekam (2003) found that participants
with and without ASD identified objects presented after a
contextually-appropriate scene (e.g., a kettle presented after a
presentation of a kitchen scene) faster and more accurately than
objects presented after a contextually-inappropriate scene (e.g., a
football presented after a presentation of a kitchen scene). That is,
object identification was similarly facilitated by the appropriate
context in both TD individuals and individuals with ASD. These
findings indicate typical use of context in object recognition, a
process that according to Bar (2004) occurs early in the hierarchy
and that Ben Shalom includes at the second level. It should be
noted that López and Leekam’s results revealed that subjects
with ASD made more errors in naming objects, regardless of
whether the previous scene provided appropriate context or not,
a finding that we suggest may point toward a third-level deficit
in precise categorization, rather than atypicality in second-level
integration.
In sum, central properties of perceptual integration that,
according to the evidence presented, characterize second-order
representations—feature integration, susceptibility to visual
illusions and use of context in aiding object recognition—seem
to be similar among TD and ASD individuals; and to the best
of our knowledge, there is no evidence suggesting atypicalities
in second-level representations in ASD. We conclude that it is
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plausible that perceptual integration characteristic of the second
level is not atypical among people with ASD.
Evidence for Atypical Third-Level Integration in
Autism
Studies such as those reviewed in the previous section have led
to modifications of the weak central coherence theory (Frith
and Happé, 1994). Originally, the theory postulated that there
is a core failure in global processing in autism that leads to a
reduced ability to integrate component features of a figure into
a coherent whole. Later, Happé and Frith (2006) revised the
theory, and put more emphasis on superior local processing as
reflecting a cognitive style. Plaisted (2001) suggests a competing
hypothesis, the reduced generalization theory, according to
which there is reduced processing of similarities between objects
in autism, and yet processing of differentiating or unique features
is intact. This theory postulates that individuals with autism
should show lower categorization abilities, which we suggest
in the present section is to be attributed to an atypicality in
third-level processing, rather than to an anomalous integration
at the second level. The reduced generalization and the weak
central coherence theories are consistent with both conceptions
of atypicality in integration we have suggested—insufficient
emphasis of the representation of binding information or a
deficiency in precise categorization. However, since the tasks
reviewed above indicate high accessibility of representations
of binding, the second possibility is more plausible. In this
section we examine the second conception of atypicality, i.e.,
the one on which there is a deficit in higher categorization
among individuals with autism. We provide evidence for
atypicality in third-level processing among autistics, manifesting
in divergence in properties of third-level representations and
neural activity.
Evidence for Viewpoint Variant Third-Level
Representations in Autism
We have argued that representations of coherent objects
matching second-level representations seem to be typical among
individuals with ASD. However, we found that there are
some indications of atypicality in tasks that require third-
level processing. Specifically, we suggest that there is some
evidence for atypical formation of viewpoint-invariant object
representations at the third level (as it is conceptualized by ILH)
among individuals with autism—such representations are not as
easily and automatically formed in ASD.
Ropar and Mitchell (2002) examined shape constancy in
autism. They showed participants images of ellipses in three
conditions, and then asked them to recreate the shape they saw
on a different screen. In the prior knowledge condition, the
shape was presented alone in a darkened display without any
perspective cues, and participants were told that the shape is
a slanted circle. In the prior knowledge and perspective cues
condition, the shape was presented in an illuminated display
containing perspective cues and participants were told the shape
presented is a slanted circle. In the control condition, the
shape presented was a non-slanted ellipse, presented without
any perspective cues. All participants recreated the shape as
more circular in the prior knowledge and prior knowledge
and perspective cues conditions compared to the control
condition. TD participants and participants with ASD differed
only in the prior knowledge condition: participants in the
ASD group exaggerated circularity less than TD participant,
and recreated a shape that more closely resembles the original
one. This task examines WM representations of objects,
because participants had to recreate the shapes based on their
memory. In ILH terms, it seems that individuals with ASD
hadmore difficulty creating a viewpoint-invariant representation
of the circle when they were provided with prior knowledge
regarding the identity of the shape, thus relying more on
the representation of the perceptual object created at the
second level (an ellipse), which is dependent on viewpoint.
On the other hand, TD individuals relied on a viewpoint-
invariant representation (a circle) in accordance with prior
knowledge. When perspective cues were provided, individuals
with ASD perceived the object as more circular, similarly
to TD individuals. In this case, since cues were apparent,
representations at the second and third levels should be more
similar.
Mottron et al. (1999) found that individuals with autism
were better than TD individuals in reproducing impossible
3D figures. Subjects with ASD copied the figures faster
than TD participants. In addition, while TD subjects copied
impossible figures considerably slower than possible figures,
there was a smaller cost of impossibility among subjects
with ASD. These findings have recently been replicated
(Sheppard et al., 2009). Copying involves the construction
and maintenance of a representation of the object in visual
WM (Guérin et al., 1999), and thus performance relies on
third-level representations. Mottron et al. explain their results
as emerging from a difficulty relating elements of a figure
among individuals with ASD, perhaps due to limited capacity
to hold parts of objects in WM simultaneously. We suggest
that, similarly to our interpretation of Ropar and Mitchell’s
(2002) results, third-level representation among individuals
with ASD are more similar to second-level representations,
in that they are viewpoint specific, rather than viewpoint
invariant. First, this task requires maintaining the shape in WM
while copying and thus reflects representations held in WM.
In addition, the impossibility of the figure should manifest
mainly at the third level of the hierarchy: at the second
level, the drawing should be represented as it is seen (from
the viewpoint of the observer), yet the fact that impossible
figures violate 3D rules obstructs formation of a viewpoint-
invariant representation at the third level. The superiority of
individuals with ASD may thus reflect differences in third-level
representations.
Liu et al. (2011) found that in an explicit possibility task,
in which participants were asked to judge whether figures
are impossible or not, participants with and without ASD
had comparable performance and similar patterns of brain
activation. During this task, both TD subjects and subjects
with ASD recruited more frontoparietal areas compared to
a second task, in which the same stimuli were used but
participants were not required to judge the possibility of the
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figures. However, in the second task participants with ASD
showed less interference from impossible figures, as well as less
activation in medial-frontal areas and less connectivity between
medial-frontal and posterior-visuospatial areas compared to
TD participants. Liu et al. explain their results as indicating
a greater need to suppress the global configuration of the
figure in the TD group, as indicated by higher activation in
frontal areas related to high-level executive functions (such
as medial and superior frontal regions). These results may
indicate that third-level representations in the form of viewpoint-
invariant representations of objects can be achieved among
individuals with ASD, but these are not achieved automatically.
That is, whereas representation among TD individuals become
viewpoint-invariant automatically once they are processed
at the third level, among individuals with ASD third-level
representations are more similar to second-level representations
(i.e., viewpoint-specific), but can be processed to become
viewpoint-invariant according to need (e.g., task demands).
This explanation is consistent with Ben Shalom’s suggestion
that individuals with autism can overcome their difficulty in
integration via use of effortful logical processing of perception.
In addition, our explanation is in agreement with Mottron
et al.’s (2006) claim that high-level processing is automatic
or mandatory among TD individuals, but optional among
individuals with autism.
Another image copying study, using bistable ambiguous
figures such as the duck/rabbit image, reveals viewpoint specific
third-level representations in autism as well. Allen and Chambers
(2011) examined implicit and explicit processing of ambiguous
figures among participants with ASD who had cognitive delay
and children with intellectual disability. First, participants were
asked to copy ambiguous and non-ambiguous figures, after
either being given a label for a presented figure (e.g., ‘‘draw this
rabbit’’) or not (‘‘draw this picture’’). Afterwards, participants
were asked several times what they see in the image, in order
to assess spontaneous reversals. Then, participants who did not
report perceiving the alternative interpretation of the figure
were informed about it and informed reversals were assessed.
Finally, they were asked to copy the image once again. Results
indicate that when participants were not given a label before
they drew the pictures, both groups provided similar figures
before and after reversals. However, the groups were affected
differently by the introduction of a label: participants in the
learning disability group provided different drawings after a
label compared to the first drawing (indicating that labeling
one interpretation influenced their construction of the drawing),
whereas participants in the ASD group provided two similar
drawings regardless of the label. This may indicate, once again,
that individuals with autism have third-level representations
that are more similar to second-level representations. The
two groups had comparable explicit interpretation reversals,
and in both groups the number of reversals increased after
participants were informed about the bistability of the figures.
This suggests that effortful use of reasoning resources is
typical in autism, consistently with Ben Shalom’s claim that
individuals with ASD compensate for lack of integration by
using effortful reasoning, and with Mottron et al.’s suggestion
that high-level processing can be achieved at will in autism.
Allen and Chambers concluded that individuals with autism
have typical perceptual representations but atypical conceptual
representations. This conclusion is in line with our suggestion
that third-level, rather than second-level, representations are
atypical in autism.
Evidence for Atypical Use of Third-Level Precise
Categorization in Autism
According to Marr (1982) and the ILH, third-level
representations are important for categorization and
conceptual processing. Thus, atypicality in viewpoint-
invariant representations is expected to have implications
for categorization. In her reduced generalization theory, Plaisted
(2001) suggests that among people with autism discriminating
features are more salient, while features held in common between
objects are processed to a lesser degree, giving rise to atypicality
in formation of categories and concepts. The ability to generalize
across situations is reduced due to saliency of differentiating
aspects of separate cases. Her account is supported by a personal
description by Grandin:
‘‘. . .my concept of dogs is inextricably linked to every
dog I’ve ever known. It’s as if I have a card catalogue of
dogs I have seen, complete with pictures . . .’’ (Grandin,
1996, p. 28).
O’riordan (2004) has added that generalization capacities
are important for high-level processes, such as categorization
and reasoning. Consistent with the reduced generalization
theory, Church et al. (2010) found that high-functioning
autistics use family resemblance (or a family prototype)
less than controls during categorization of objects (e.g.,
when judging whether a non-social figure belongs to a
newly learned category). Plaisted’s explanation appeals
to third-level integration atypicality. Thus, the reduced
generalization theory is compatible with our suggestion
that atypicality in integration among people with ASD is at the
third level.
The change detection paradigm is one of the most commonly
used in the study of perceptual consciousness. In this paradigm,
subjects are presented with two pictures of a scene that may
differ in one detail (e.g., one item has changed its color or
disappeared), and are asked to detect the change. Findings
consistently reveal a phenomenon called ‘‘change blindness’’:
people fail to notice the change, even after re-viewing both
pictures several times. The prevalent explanation is that changes
in items to which attention is not allocated cannot be detected.
One must compare the original image, stored in WM, with the
new image, and thus an itemmust reachWM in order for change
to be recognized. Some infer from this phenomenon that even
though we think we have a rich experience of the world, we
in fact have a sparse experience (e.g., O’Regan and Noë, 2001).
This stance is usually supported by those who advocate the view
that access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness are
not dissociable. Others explain change blindness as stemming
from failure in accessibility (e.g., Block, 2001; Prinz, 2011a;
Smithies, 2011), so that the changed object is experienced,
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yet the change is not detected due to deficiency in its
storage in WM. According to Block (2001, 2008), this lack of
accessibility is a result of failure in conceptualization of the
changed item.
Several studies have examined differences in change
blindness between TD individuals and individuals with
autism. When change is perceptual and does not require
precise categorization, people with ASD seem to perform
similarly to TD people. For example, Burack et al. (2009)
found similar accuracy and reaction times among subjects
with ASD and TD subjects who were asked to indicate
which of two images of objects presented simultaneously
side by side has changed.2 Since the objects depicted in
their study were presented without a background scene,
detection of changes could have been executed based on
perception, without a demand to categorize the objects.
Nonetheless, other studies, in which manipulations of context
and semantic role were introduced, indicate impairments in
processing of precise categories, although these results are not
conclusive.
With regard to contextual influences on detection of
changes in a scene, Loth et al. (2008) demonstrated that
individuals with autism are less sensitive to influences of
context. Performance of subjects in the TD and ASD groups
was similar when changes were contextually-appropriate (either
from the same general category, e.g., replacement of a kettle
with a frying pan, or from the same precise category, e.g.,
replacement of a kettle with a different one). However, the
groups differed when changes were contextually-inappropriate
(e.g., replacement of a kettle in a kitchen with a football):
While TD individuals detected changes in this condition
faster than in contextually-appropriate conditions, individuals
with ASD had similar performance in all change conditions.
Contrary to Loth et al., Fletcher-Watson et al. (2006) found
a similar pattern of results among subjects with ASD and
TD subjects, and that both groups detected contextually-
inappropriate changes faster than they detected contextually-
appropriate changes. However, in Fletcher-Watson et al.’s
version of the task, participants could control switches between
the two images, so that they could choose when to look back
at the original scene, and participants with ASD made more
switches compared to TD participants. This methodological
difference may account for the discrepancies in the results of the
two studies.
This lack of benefit in detection of contextually-inappropriate
stimuli may indicate a third-level deficit in categorization. Note
that the kind of context that models such as Bar and colleagues’
(Bar, 2004; Bar et al., 2006) and the 2SI model (Schendan and
Kutas, 2007; Schendan and Stern, 2008) refer to is not relevant
in this case, because in the case of contextually-inappropriate
items, in which changes are detected more easily among TD
individuals, early top-down contextual effects should not aid
2It should be noted that in the TD group mental age was correlated with
performance, whereas in the ASD group there was no such correlation,
a result that may indicate different developmental trajectories. However,
overall detection of changes in objects was similar in the two groups.
object recognition (on the contrary, these models will predict
slower processing of these objects, see Bar, 2004). In Loth
et al.’s (2008) and Fletcher-Watson et al.’s (2006) experiments,
participants were provided with prolonged exposure to stimuli,
and thus it is more reasonable that inappropriate items were
processed bottom-up in a manner more in line with Marr’s
levels of processing. As was noted in the previous section,
facilitation of object recognition based on context in the sense
Bar refers to seems to be typical among individuals with autism
(López and Leekam, 2003). The lack of difference between
subjects with ASD and TD subjects in contextually-appropriate
changes in Loth et al.’s (2008) study supports this conclusion
as well.
Semantic processing is yet another kind of integration
examined by using the change detection paradigm. Results
regarding sensitivity to semantic roles of items in scenes are
conflicting as well. Smith and Milne (2009) examined change
detection according to the semantic role of items using short
films. They found that, overall, subjects with ASD detect
continuity changes in the films better than TD subjects. In
addition, while participants in both groups detect central changes
more accurately than marginal changes, the difference between
the conditions is smaller among individuals with ASD, indicating
less sensitivity to semantic information. On the other hand,
Fletcher-Watson and colleagues (Fletcher-Watson et al., 2006,
2012) used still images of scenes and found that, similarly
to TD participants, individuals with ASD detect changes in
items with a central semantic role (e.g., a boat on the river)
better than changes in items that had a marginal role in the
scene (e.g., a tree among other trees). However, they found
that participants in the ASD group were slower to detect
changes in marginal items compared to participants in the
TD group, and made more switches back to the original
scene in this condition. Their results, as opposed to Smith
and Milne’s, indicate sensitivity to semantic information and
greater saliency of semantically central items compared to
semantically marginal items. Methodological differences may
account for discrepancies in this case as well. Smith and
Milne’s task was more demanding: they used a dual task,
in which in addition to change detection, participants also
had to follow the plot of the scene and answer semantic
question regarding what was going on. It could be that the
lack of effect of semantic role in the ASD group was caused
by high cognitive load on participants’ WM, which could
interfere with conceptual processing and effortful integration
of precise categories and objects. Thus it could be argued
that under low cognitive load, semantic processing can take
place and an integrated representation of both the object and
its precise category can be achieved, at least with regard to
semantically salient objects. However, under high cognitive
load or for semantically marginal objects, this integration is
not achieved among individuals with ASD. In the case of
high load, this could be due to lack of resources required
for effortful integration or the creation of viewpoint-invariant
representation of the object for identification. In the case of
semantically marginal objects this could result from attentional
processes. Fletcher-Watson et al. (2006) explained the finding
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that individuals with ASD identified changes in marginal
items slower than TD individuals as reflecting a deficit
in attentional shifting between items or away from central
items (which were selected first). In line with other findings
reviewed above, this may point to a WM deficit: such an
explanation involves updating the content of WM, because it
requires the removal and substitution of central items with
marginal ones.
Evidence for Atypical Neural Activity Attributed to the
Third Level in Autism
Lamme (2004, 2006, 2010) addresses differences between
the second and third levels in terms of patterns of neural
activity. Second-level activity is characterized by local recurrent
processing between visual areas, whereas third-level activity is
more widespread and includes co-activation of frontoparietal
areas as well. The literature on neural processing in autism points
to atypical global connectivity and functioning of areas related to
WM or the global workspace, in accordance with our suggestion
of a third-level abnormality among individuals with ASD.
Ring et al. (1999) conducted an fMRI study that examined
brain activity of subjects with ASD and TD controls during
performance in the embedded figure task. In this task, which
is thought to involve visual WM, subjects are presented with
a complex pattern and a simple figure, and are asked to
identify the hidden simple figure in the complex design. The
general finding is that autistics outperform TD subjects in
this task (Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen, 1997). Ring et al. found
that participants with ASD and TD subjects had a similar
pattern of activation in most brain areas. However, the ASD
group had higher activation in association areas, whereas the
control group had higher activation in frontoparietal areas
associated with WM (the global workspace) and attentional
allocation: the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the superior
parietal lobule (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Baars, 2005).
A comparable pattern of less activation in global workspace
areas among subjects with ASD compared to TD subjects and
similar activation in other visual processing areas was observed
by Luna et al. (2002) as well, using a different spatial WM
task. Ring et al. suggest that this pattern may indicate that
subjects with ASD use more mental imagery when performing
the embedded figure task, while TD participants rely more
on their WM. We explain these results as reflecting use of
third-level representations that are viewpoint-variant rather
than invariant in WM among individuals with autism. This
interpretation is supported by Ranganath’s (2006) suggestion
that the dorsal prefrontal cortex is in charge of the manipulation
and reconstruction of complex stimuli, via reduction of the
saliency of relations between features based on prior knowledge.
Our explanation is consistent with typical explanations of
superiority of individuals with ASD in this task, which
appeal to less interference from the global shape and an
ability to focus on local details (e.g., Happé and Frith,
2006).
Just et al. (2004) found that during sentence completion
tasks there is less connectivity between the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex and parietal and occipital areas among
participants with ASD compared to TD subjects. They suggest
the underconnectivity theory, according to which autism is
caused by lesser functioning of integrative circuitry in frontal
integrating centers, especially when tasks require high-level
abstraction and during high load. Although the task utilized
in their study is not perceptual, and may seem irrelevant to
our argument, the underconnectivity revealed in their study
involves frontoparietal areas engaged in the global workspace,
which is not specific to certain modalities or cognitive domains
(Dehaene andNaccache, 2001). Similarly, Courchesne and Pierce
(2005) have proposed that in autism there is increased local
connectivity between close areas (including increased local
frontal activity) and reduced long-distance co-activation between
the frontal lobe and other regions. They suggest that this
pattern leads to impairments in widespread processing and
in integration of information from separate modules and in
spreading of contextual feedback towards lower areas. Both
descriptions fit impairment at the third-level as conceptualized
by Lamme.
Conclusion and Implications
The Argument for Locating the Atypicality in
Autism at the Third-Level
In line with Ben Shalom’s model and other tripartite-models of
perceptual processing (ILH and Lamme’s model), we assume that
processing of visual information can be usefully characterized
as proceeding in three stages. The models differ with respect
to the level at which certain categories are integrated with
representations of objects. In agreement with Lamme’s model
and the 2SImodel, we suggest that initial classification is achieved
at the second level, yet objects are ascribed to their precise
categories at the third level.
Based on empirical evidence, we have argued that autistics
and non-autistics have similar viewpoint-specific second-level
representations, characterized by feature binding, susceptibility
to illusions and contextual facilitation. However, we suggest
that individuals with autism have atypical third-level processing.
First, whereas third-level representations in TD individuals
seem to be viewpoint-invariant, data from studies examining
shape constancy and copying impossible figures and ambiguous
figures suggests that individuals with ASD have viewpoint-
specific third-level representations, which are more similar to
second-level representations. Second, there is some evidence
for abnormality in third-level representations in individuals
with autism that consists in a deficiency in the integration of
perceptual representations of objects with precise categories. (We
agree with Ben Shalom that individuals with autism can, at will,
make up for the difficulty in categorization via effortful use of
WM resources and use of logic and reasoning; they are capable
of manipulating their third-level representations so that these
would allow object recognition.) Third, individuals with autism
seem to have atypical neural activity that is associated with third-
level processing: lower global connectivity and lower activation
in frontoparietal areas related to WM or to the global workspace
in comparison with TD individuals. We conclude that atypicality
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in integration in autism is better conceptualized as third-level
atypicality than as second-level atypicality.
The debate regarding whether phenomenal consciousness
and access consciousness are dissociable and our argument for
the claim that the central atypicality in autism resides at the
level of third-level rather than second-level representations are
interconnected. On the one hand, the stance one takes with
respect to that debate has implications for one’s interpretation
of our framework for understanding the atypicality in autism as
a third-level atypicality—specifically, for whether this atypicality
is understood as pertaining to phenomenal consciousness or to
access consciousness. On the other hand, our argumentmay have
implications for that debate—the commitment of a particular
stance to attribute, or withhold attributions of, typical basic
phenomenal states to autistics may be useful for evaluating its
plausibility.
Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness in
Autism
Different stances in the debate over whether phenomenal
consciousness and access consciousness are dissociable may lead
to different interpretations of our suggestion that individuals
with autism have typical second-level processing but atypical
third-level processing. That debate, recall, takes the form of a
scientific controversy over whether second-level representations
are phenomenally conscious (the dissociation view), or whether
phenomenality requires that a representation be modulated by
third-level processing, and is therefore restricted to third-level
representations. Thus, if access consciousness and phenomenal
consciousness are not dissociable, i.e., if the latter requires the
former, then regardless of whether the atypicality arises already
at the second level or is restricted to the third level, individuals
with autism and TD individuals differ in their basic experiences.
The non-dissociation view entails that every difference in access
consciousness implies a difference in phenomenal consciousness,
hence the fact that the access consciousness of autistics is atypical
implies that their phenomenal consciousness is atypical as well.
However, if the two sorts of consciousness are dissociable,
atypicality of access consciousness does not imply atypicality
in phenomenal consciousness. In that case, the view for which
we have argued—namely, that the abnormality characteristic
of autism is restricted to the third-level and that second-level
processing and representations in autistics are intact—opens the
door for the possibility that TD individuals and ASD individuals
share their basic experiences. Due to our adherence to the
dissociation view, it is this latter possibility that we endorse.
It should be noted that, even granted our claim that the
atypicality in autism is located at the third-level, there is a
possible middle position regarding the phenomenal states of
individuals with autism. This position follows if one holds
that second-level representations are phenomenally conscious,
yet rejects the assumption (which we tend to endorse) that
the contents of phenomenal states are exhaustively determined
at the second level. That assumption is rejected by those
who take the contents of perceptual phenomenal states to
be (at least partly) conceptual, or, relatedly, to represent not
only ‘‘simple’’ properties such as color, shape, illumination
and motion, but also more ‘‘sophisticated’’ properties, such
as plate, tree or eucalyptus (see, e.g., Siegel, 2006, 2010).
Their view may still be compatible with the dissociation of
phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness, provided
that they hold that the contents of phenomenal states of TD
individuals who are conceptually sophisticated typically involves
two layers, the first of which is derived from the second-
level and the second of which is derived from the third
level. Conjoined with our claim that the atypicality in autism
characterizes the third-level, that view would predict that the
experiences of autistics have a lot in common with those of
TD individuals, yet there are also some differences, due to
difficulties autistics have applying certain specific categories at
the third level.
Implications of the Case of Autism for the
Overflow Debate
An important question for any account of phenomenal
consciousness concerns the plausibility of its commitments
regarding ascriptions of various phenomenally conscious states.
That is, the question concerns the set of subjects (or creatures)
to whom the account attributes any phenomenality, and (what
is more relevant for our purposes) to whom it attributes
phenomenality that is similar to that of typical (mature,
human) subjects. Put in prevalent philosophical jargon, an
account that is committed to attributions of phenomenal states
similar to those of typical subjects to subjects who seem
to lack them is said to be (too) liberal; an account that is
committed to withholding such attributions from subjects who
seem to have them is said to be chauvinist. Clearly, our pre-
theoretic judgments regarding attributions of phenomenally
conscious states form only a fallible starting point, which may
be overturned by scientific and theoretical investigations. Yet,
other things being equal, it is an advantage of a theory of
mentality if it matches those judgments—we should strive for
a reflective equilibrium between our pre-theoretic judgments
on the one hand, and considerations regarding e.g., the
explanatory powers of particular theories of phenomenality on
the other hand.
A clear example that concerns ASD is the charge of
chauvinism made by many philosophers against central versions
of the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness.
According to this theory, ‘‘a mental state is a conscious
state when, and only when, it is accompanied by a suitable
HOT’’ (Rosenthal, 1990/1997, p. 741), or, more specifically, if
it is accompanied by a thought—grounded non-inferentially
and non-observationally—to the effect that one is in that
state. Autism is of course associated with theory of mind
deficits, and specifically, individuals with autism have been
claimed to have impaired ability to form HOTs about their
experiences (see, e.g., Perner, 1998; Frith and Happé, 1999).
Given that at least some low-functioning autistics cannot form
any such thoughts, it follows from HOT that such autistics are
not phenomenally conscious! While some (e.g., Perner, 1998;
Carruthers, 2000) have bitten that bullet and accepted that
consequence, it is considered by others to be a reductio ad
absurdum of HOT.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 12 April 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 204
Yatziv and Jacobson Visual consciousness in autism
Now, we by no means suggest that the charge of chauvinism
that can be mounted against the non-dissociation view of
the relations between phenomenal consciousness and access
consciousness is as strong as the charge just described against the
HOT. The non-dissociation view is not committed to denying
that individuals with ASD are phenomenally conscious; it is
committed only to their having quite atypical phenomenal
states. Nevertheless, it seems to us that the non-dissociation
view tends to exaggerate the differences between the mental
lives of autistics and TD individuals. No doubt, there are
significant differences. We believe that the dissociation view
adequately accounts for those differences by taking them
to be differences in access consciousness (rather than in
phenomenal consciousness) i.e., by taking the bulk part of the
atypicality in autism to pertain to the ways autistics access
their experiences. The non-dissociation view, in contrast, is
committed to interpreting the data described in this paper
regarding those aspects of perceptual processing that are
shared among subjects of the two groups as having little
relevance to the personal level, and as scarcely reflected in
the most basic ways in which they experience the world. This
consequence of the non-dissociation view seems to us less
plausible, and so as one that, other things being equal, should
count against it.3
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